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Re: [TLS] TLS Visibility Inside the Data Center (was: I-D Action: draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00.txt)

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Wed, 16 November 2016 21:42 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>, Matthew Green <matthewdgreen@gmail.com>, "ynir.ietf@gmail.com" <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS Visibility Inside the Data Center (was: I-D Action: draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00.txt)
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Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 21:41:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Visibility Inside the Data Center (was: I-D Action: draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00.txt)
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> Isn’t possible to achieve the goals of this proposal without re-using DH secrets?

> For example, let DH_secret = KDF ( monitoring_key, server.hello , client.hello), or something similar.  Ideally, the monitoring_key should be updated frequently as possible (while keeping it synchronized).  

As an implementor (I'm a member of the OpenSSL dev team), I strongly prefer something that is honest about what it does, rather than something that appears to be more than that.  So while we might take on a PR that allows you to set a static key for the handshake, I would try very hard to veto something like the above.  And as a user, I would prefer to know what is going on; I can cache the secrets and if I see the same one more than once, I can take the appropriate action.

And while I'm here, I have a question on the draft.  Does the construct "(EC) DH" mean "ephemeral DH or ECDH", like a shorthand?
 
--  
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz

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