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Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 17 November 2016 07:15 UTC

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References: <2d2ba626-0b5d-590f-efb7-e4ad30b5608b@esat.kuleuven.be> <201611081626.03635.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <8C67E8BB-B230-4C84-A890-C57614FF8A46@esat.kuleuven.be>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 16:14:39 +0900
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To: Roel Peeters <roel.peeters@esat.kuleuven.be>
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Cc: Jens Hermans <Jens.Hermans@esat.kuleuven.be>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3
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This paragraph refers to the anti-downgrade mechanism described in 4.1.3.

-Ekr


On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 6:56 AM, Roel Peeters <roel.peeters@esat.kuleuven.be>
wrote:

> Hi Dave,
>
> We are wondering because of this piece of text from the RFC EDITOR just
> above paragraph 4.1.4 on Hello Retry Request:
>
> RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH Implementations of draft
> versions (see Section 4.2.1.1) of this specification SHOULD NOT implement
> this mechanism on either client and server. A pre-RFC client connecting to
> RFC servers, or vice versa, will appear to downgrade to TLS 1.2. With the
> mechanism enabled, this will cause an interoperability failure.
> Best,
> Roel
>
> On 8 Nov 2016, at 22:26, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, November 08, 2016 09:55:36 am Roel Peeters wrote:
>
> we are also wondering whether or not the Hello Retry Request will be
> included or omitted in the standard. Leaving it out will make TLS 1.3
> vulnerable again to downgrade attacks ...
>
>
> Why are you wondering about this? HRR is in the specification and there
> has been no discussion to remove it.
>
>
> Dave
>
>
>
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