Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted
Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com> Tue, 13 July 2010 17:16 UTC
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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 19:15:11 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted
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Seems like we will never dig us out of this worm hole :) I have to admit that I just learned some new stuff. The idea was to not degrade the security properties of the finished message. I was under the impression that we would not do that for TLS <1.2 if we use SHA-1. I guess we are back to square 1. I'm currently on vacation and may have to rest my case until the meeting in Maastricht. /Stefan On 10-07-13 6:54 PM, "Marsh Ray" <marsh@extendedsubset.com> wrote: > On 07/13/2010 11:07 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote: >> How about MUST use SHA-1 for TLS<1.2 and the proposed solution for =< >> 1.2? > > Does it meet the requirements? What were the requirements again? > > Does it need collision resistance? > If so, SHA-1 is deprecated: > http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html >> Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures, >> digital time stamping and other applications that require collision >> resistance as soon as practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of >> hash functions for these applications after 2010. > > If it doesn't need collision resistance, does it need preimage resistance? > If not, FNV is the way to go. > If so, SHA-1 probably works but it is certainly going out of style. If > you're going to pick a hash function, SHA-256 might be a better choice. > > Sorry to be such a curmudeon, but it seems like if we're going to use > some bit string as a proxy for an object in the handshake I think the > default assumption needs be that it must not weaken the Finished > computation. If it wasn't important, we could have used FNV. But we > decided it was too security critical for FNV, if not for the object > types defined now, perhaps for other object types that will be defined > in the future. > > I don't think the "it needs to be secure but not that secure, so we need > more than X but less than Z how about Y" is a good method of selecting > the hash. If folks feel this usage doesn't require 24 bytes out of the > PRF like the Finished messages it would be good for someone to post just > a little bit of quantitative justification. (E.g., ...therefore it needs > x bits of resistance to ...) > > - Marsh
- [TLS] Second Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bi… The IESG
- Re: [TLS] Second Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc436… Paul Hoffman
- [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson