Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted
Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Tue, 13 July 2010 17:19 UTC
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 19:19:48 +0200
In-Reply-To: <4C3C9A4B.7050300@extendedsubset.com> (Marsh Ray's message of "Tue, 13 Jul 2010 11:54:35 -0500")
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted
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Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> writes: > On 07/13/2010 11:07 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote: >> How about MUST use SHA-1 for TLS<1.2 and the proposed solution for =< >> 1.2? > > Does it meet the requirements? What were the requirements again? That is a very good question. Did we establish that FNV is not good enough? Could we add a succinct writeup of the requirements to the document? I'm not sure I recall what the long discussions resulted in any more.. It is difficult to know whether SHA-1 is good enough if we don't know what it should be good enough for. /Simon > Does it need collision resistance? > If so, SHA-1 is deprecated: > http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html >> Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures, >> digital time stamping and other applications that require collision >> resistance as soon as practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of >> hash functions for these applications after 2010. > > If it doesn't need collision resistance, does it need preimage resistance? > If not, FNV is the way to go. > If so, SHA-1 probably works but it is certainly going out of style. If > you're going to pick a hash function, SHA-256 might be a better > choice. > > Sorry to be such a curmudeon, but it seems like if we're going to use > some bit string as a proxy for an object in the handshake I think the > default assumption needs be that it must not weaken the Finished > computation. If it wasn't important, we could have used FNV. But we > decided it was too security critical for FNV, if not for the object > types defined now, perhaps for other object types that will be defined > in the future. > > I don't think the "it needs to be secure but not that secure, so we > need more than X but less than Z how about Y" is a good method of > selecting the hash. If folks feel this usage doesn't require 24 bytes > out of the PRF like the Finished messages it would be good for someone > to post just a little bit of quantitative justification. (E.g., > ...therefore it needs x bits of resistance to ...) > > - Marsh
- [TLS] Second Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bi… The IESG
- Re: [TLS] Second Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc436… Paul Hoffman
- [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] New cached-info draft 09 posted Stefan Santesson