Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3
Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Tue, 08 November 2016 21:26 UTC
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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:26:03 -0500
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Cc: Jens Hermans <Jens.Hermans@esat.kuleuven.be>, Roel Peeters <roel.peeters@esat.kuleuven.be>
Subject: Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3
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On Tuesday, November 08, 2016 09:55:36 am Roel Peeters wrote: > we are also wondering whether or not the Hello Retry Request will be > included or omitted in the standard. Leaving it out will make TLS 1.3 > vulnerable again to downgrade attacks ... Why are you wondering about this? HRR is in the specification and there has been no discussion to remove it. Dave
- [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Roel Peeters
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Roel Peeters
- Re: [TLS] COSIC's look on TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla