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Re: [TLS] One approach to rollback protection

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 26 September 2011 23:51 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2011 16:53:22 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] One approach to rollback protection
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P.S. Yes, I know this is a big stinking hack.


On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> I've been doing some thinking about how to prevent rollback to
> TLS 1.0/SSLv3 from TLS 1.1-capable agents.
>
> Since there's very little deployment of TLS 1.1+, basically anything
> we do now will roll out more or less in parallel with TLS 1.1 deployment,
> as long as it's backward compatible.The obvious technique here is to
> stuff the relevant indicator in the cipher suites list, since we know that
> servers ignore unknown entries there.
>
> I've taken an initial crack at a draft for this:
> http://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-version-cs.txt
>
> -Ekr
>

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