Re: [TLS] Rethink TLS 1.3

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 26 November 2014 01:47 UTC

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Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 19:47:13 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Rethink TLS 1.3
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On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 6:28 PM, Peter Gutmann
<pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> writes:
>>Or, to put it differently, we need to state an Internet threat model
>>succintly.
>
> Exactly.  The Internet Threat Model is frequently referred to, but I have no
> idea what it actually is.  AFAIK it's either:
>
>   "I'm OK, you're OK, and the network is the problem".
>
> a quaint relic from the 1980s that hasn't been relevant for 15-20 years, or
> what I've referred to as the Inside-Out Threat Model:

Yes, it's quaint.  It's also as best we can do, unless...

>   "The threat model is defined to be whatever it is that our crypto counters".
>
> Neither of these are very useful.  In other words, we don't actually have a
> threat model, just a cardboard cut-out that we point to and say "look, we
> defend against that!".

Tell us how to go from "we assume we have local security" to "we have
local security".  I'm all ears :)

Nico
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