Re: [TLS] Application-Layer Protocol Settings

Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Tue, 07 July 2020 09:06 UTC

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Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 12:06:46 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Application-Layer Protocol Settings
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On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 03:12:45PM -0400, Victor Vasiliev wrote:
> Hello TLS and HTTP working groups,
> 
> (QUIC WG bcc'd as this has been discussed there before)
> 
> Currently, we use SETTINGS frames as an extensibility mechanism in HTTP/2
> and HTTP/3.  The SETTINGS frame is sent at the very beginning of TLS
> application data; this approach, while simple, has some drawbacks.  The
> most notable one is that when SETTINGS are used to negotiate extensions,
> there is an entire round-trip where the client can send requests, but
> doesn't know yet about any server extensions, thus making any
> extension-dependant requests take an extra RTT.
> 
> The proposed solution to this problem is to move HTTP SETTINGS frame into
> the TLS handshake.  Here are some issues where this has been discussed
> before:

I note at least two people have proposed just fixing TLS stacks to allow
sending HTTP/2 SETTINGS in 0.5-RTT data. I used to have a server that
actually did that (only if there was no CertificateRequest, due to
interface limitations, this was not TLS library limitation).

Unfortunately, this is not quite interoperable. There are HTTP/2
clients out there that just puke (with unexpected_message TLS alert,
sent post-Finished) if one tries to send SETTINGS in 0.5-RTT data.

I do not know what clients are involved (IIRC, I have heard about
problems with at least Firefox and Chrome, versions unknown), but I
would presume some sort of MITM by some client software is involved.

That was quite painful to debug. Much nastier than e.g., debugging
handshakes failing with illegal_parameter due to downnegotiation gone
wrong due to server bug (this client is still using TLS 1.3 draft 23,
and is still out there).


-Ilari