Re: [TLS] Call for Consensus on removal of renegotiation

[[e-mail] (Martin Rex)]

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> 
> 1.  In favor of removing renegotiation
> 2.  In favor of removing renegotiation with the addition of rekey facility
> 3.  Not in favor of removing renegotiation 
 

(3) Leave it in the spec,  Make it a true option for implementors.
    with a guidance that clients might need it for interop, but should
    play safe (and nail down identities once they're established) by default


I never offered/exposed renegotiation at the API to application callers,
and since January 2010, I have the server-side reject renegotiation attempts
from clients.  But the installed base of _other_ servers that use
(or require) it is to large to be ignored, and I don't see it go away
that easily...

Everything that you change from TLSv1.0/1/2 toward v1.3 will add complexity
and require more code.  This applies not just to adding new features, but
also to axing existing features that may be in current use.

A TLSv1.3 spec that requires implementors to carefully avoid TLSv1.3 for
a number of commonly used TLSv1.0/1/2 features may be even harder to
sell than TLSv1.2 and IPv6.


-Martin