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Re: [TLS] Third Option?

David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org> Thu, 17 December 2009 03:25 UTC

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Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 03:25:24 +0000
From: David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Third Option?
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Marsh Ray wrote:
> Ravi Ganesan wrote:
>> Anyone who reads the  the first documents that came out on this issue
>> (http://www.phonefactor.com/sslgapdocs/Renegotiating_TLS.pdf and
>> http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2009/11/understanding_the_tls_renegoti.html)
>> would be left with very different perceptions of the magnitude of the
>> impact. This is not unnatural in such matters; great minds usually think
>> differently...., but after all this discussion perhaps a blurb in the
>> draft with advice on who should immediately patch might be useful.
> 
> In short, everyone* needs to patch and disable compatible/insecure mode
> as soon as is practical.
> 
> *Except those who can prove that their endpoint cannot renegotiate and
> will never be willing to talk to a server that can possibly renegotiate.

No, even those.

If any server does not patch, it will soon fail to be interoperable with
clients that require patched servers.

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood  ⚥  http://davidsarah.livejournal.com

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