[TLS] Third Option?

[Ravi Ganesan <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Dec 16, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Marsh Ray <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Ravi Ganesan wrote:
> >
> > A third option is to leave renegotiation in, but create an advisory that
> > explains the semantics;
>
> What do you (as a vendor) tell your customers when they know they are
> vulnerable and call you for a fix?
>
>
Have TLS 1.3 code ready and tell them to upgrade to it.  Asking customers to
move to newer release in order to fix security problems is something the
market understands. (did not say 'likes').

However, if you are correct in your impact analysis in your original paper,
then an emergency patch is the appropriate response. I am not sure I know
enough to agree with your impact analysis, but either way, good job done by
your team and Martin on this discovery -- it will make TLS 1.3 better.

One stat that might allow us  to ascertain immediate impact: If I am a web
site who strictly ONLY uses server side SSL (with client auth being handled
by passwords, etc.),  And, I have ability to turn of renego. Will that do
the trick? If so what portion of SSL users fall into this use-case?



-- 
Ravi Ganesan
[e-mail]
www.findravi.com