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Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 01 September 2016 14:00 UTC

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References: <6918283.boJRZ9WqjH@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBMOyM2v3gt69gHzfW7k5w=OwFqCUiER-bPERfNkLGhpWQ@mail.gmail.com> <6822534.tPWjKYA1SU@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBN_TPyYD63u4t41SKn-T6ugZdpxgM8i7-tJ82tU13+yUA@mail.gmail.com> <20160901131521.rjw3jebdjwwizp2z@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 06:45:29 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMUA8tzsPr_6pC6kRzhPifxuz4YjSRo1KB2V52SiGWstw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
> > > essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is
> not
> > > unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
> >
> > It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.
>
> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
> early_data extension?
>

I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.

-Ekr


>
> -Ilari
>

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