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Re: [TLS] Summary of discussion regarding spontaneuous authentication

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Wed, 22 October 2014 15:59 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:59:48 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Summary of discussion regarding spontaneuous authentication
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Summary of discussion regarding spontaneuous authentication
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> I tend to think that we need a more general mechanism for indicating
> support for certificate types and signature algorithms.  Maybe we could
> unconditionally include those in the early handshake instead.

Yes.  In two years when MSFT and Google start deprecating SHA-2 for Keccak, it'd be nice to know which cert chain to send.  Or when I don't know whether to send an RSA or ECDSA certificate next year. 

--  
Principal Security Engineer, Akamai Technologies
IM: rsalz@jabber.me Twitter: RichSalz

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