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Re: [TLS] Summary of discussion regarding spontaneuous authentication

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org> Wed, 22 October 2014 13:06 UTC

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Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 15:06:29 +0200
From: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>
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To: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Summary of discussion regarding spontaneuous authentication
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On 22/10/2014 14:51, Tom Ritter wrote:
> On Oct 22, 2014 8:07 AM, "Martin Thomson" <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I forgot one point that we discussed.
>>
>> We discussed the removal of the CertificateRequest and we will permit
>> the client to unilaterally send authentication.
> 
> Will permit it to be absent, or will remove CertificateRequest entirely?
> 
My understanding is it would be entirely removed.

>> The theory here is that clients tend to know whether they need to
>> authenticate.  Most uses of mutual authentication start with the
>> client knowing that they need to authenticate.
> 
> Well, the human knows he needs a client certificate for this website, the
> Browser does not unless it stores that information. (And still needs to
> learn it for first connect)
> 
> If CertificateRequest is being removed, it's not clear to me how a browser
> would know to include a client cert. An alert and reconnect?  (For other
> applications like VPNs, obviously much easier to solve.)
>
That would be moved to the application layer, eg for HTTP(bis) that would be
addressed by Martin's "cant" draft as he briefly mentioned:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-httpbis-cant-01

Manuel.

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