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Re: [TLS] simplistic renego protection

Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me> Fri, 20 November 2009 03:39 UTC

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Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 19:37:06 -0800
From: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] simplistic renego protection
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On 2009-11-19 11:20 PST, David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
> David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
>> Nasko Oskov wrote:

>>> If the MiTM sends a client hello to the server that has no extension,
>>> then the server has no way to drop the connection. This will require
>>> a strict server to prevent the attack and strict server config will
>>> not be reality for a long time. What am I missing?
>> 
>> That, in the RI approach, strict server config is essential from the
>> start.
> 
> Point of clarification: "strict server" here means that the server does 
> not accept *renegotiations* with an unpatched client. It still accepts 
> initial handshakes.

If that is a "strict server", then what is a "lenient server"?
Is it a vulnerable server?

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