Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02.txt
"Andreas Walz" <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> Thu, 12 January 2017 15:27 UTC
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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2017 16:27:39 +0100
From: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
To: raja.ashok@huawei.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02.txt
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Dear all, I read through the draft and I do have some questions/comments which you can find below: -> Section 1, 2nd paragraph: Maybe one could mention explicitly that the new extension allows to do during the Hello phase what would otherwise be done in separate messages in a separate round trip. -> Section 3, 2nd paragraph, under a): it is written "...it checks whether it supports PSK based authentication for its client.". What does "its client" refer to? This is supposed to refer to the ordinary PSK handshake where the server only knows the client's network address at this point in time, isn’t it? -> Section 5.2, 1st paragraph: "Clients supporting this extension should include ...". Is there a reason you don't use "SHOULD"? -> Section 5.2: There is no statement about the order of PSK identities in the extension. Does it mean the order is of no relevance at all? Why not allowing the client to express its preferences by means of ordering the items in the list? -> Section 5.3: The fact that abbreviating the handshake only works for pure PSK cipher suites is only mentioned in the third paragraph. Maybe this can be made more explicit somewhere at the beginning of this section (e.g. changing the heading to "Abbreviated Handshake for pure PSK Cipher Suites" or the like)? -> Section 5.3, 4th paragraph: the last paragraph only states that for DHE_PSK, RSA_PSK, ECDHE_PSK the server and client key exchange messages are still required. It doesn't say anything about whether the presence of the new extension changes the format of these messages. I would expect that server and client key exchange messages omit the PSK_ID part then…or do they keep that part? What is the content then? This should be mentioned somehow, maybe as a separate section? -> Section 5.3: What is a server (client) expected to do if it receives a client (server) key exchange message during an abbreviated handshake (with pure PSK cipher suites)? Maybe mention "During an abbreviated handshake the server MUST NOT send a server key exchange message and the client MUST NOT send a client key exchange message. Otherwise the receiver MUST abort the handshake with an unexpected_message alert." Some minor comments/typos: -> "PSK" and "pre-shared key" is used alternately in the draft -> Section 2, 2nd paragraph: "Incase" -> "In case" -> Section 5.2, 2nd paragraph: "Please note that, Server MUST include this extension ...". I would change this to "Servers MUST NOT send this extension unless the client sent it in the client hello." -> Section 5.3: A "(" is missing in the diagram below "ServerHello" -> There are some more typos. Do you have a Git repository where I could post a pull request for those? I guess that would be more efficient than listing them here. Thanks and Cheers, Andi Walz ___________________________________ Andreas Walz Research Engineer Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK) Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany >>> Raja ashok <raja.ashok@huawei.com> 01/11/17 1:31 PM >>> Hi All A new extension is proposed for [D]TLS1.2 and its lower version(not for [D]TLS1.3), to send PSKID in client hello msg instead of client key exchange msg. Using this extension, client can send its list of PSKIDs to server in its hello msg and server can select any one of them and respond in its hello msg. - With the help of this extn, PSK cipher handshake can be completed in 1RTT. Messages exchanged are similar to resumption. - For DHE_PSK, RSA_PSK and ECDHE_PSK ciphers, PSKID in client hello msg gives additional information to server for cipher negotiation. If unknown PSKIDs are present, then server can select any NON PSK cipher or fail at that place only (instead of failing in finished message verification). Already we received interest and review comments from Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos, David Woodhouse and Andreas Walz. Based on that we have submitted the 3rd version of this document. I am requesting otheprovide comments for further improvements. Regards, Raja Ashok V K Huawei Technologies Bangalore, India http://www.huawei.com 本邮件及其附件含有华为公司的保密信息,仅限于发送给上面地址中列出的个人或群组。禁 止任何其他人以任何形式使用(包括但不限于全部或部分地泄露、复制、或散发)本邮件中 的信息。如果您错收了本邮件,请您立即电话或邮件通知发件人并删除本邮件! This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it! -----Original Message----- From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org] Sent: 17 December 2016 04:11 To: Raja ashok; Raja ashok; Jayaraghavendran Kuppannan Subject: New Version Notification for draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02.txt A new version of I-D, draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02.txt has been successfully submitted by Raja Ashok V K and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension Revision: 02 Title: TLS/DTLS PSK Identity Extension Document date: 2016-12-15 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 10 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02 Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-02 Abstract: Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Key Exchange Mechanism is primarily used in constrained environments where resource intensive Asymmetric Cryptography cannot be used. In the Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, constrained devices are commonly used for collecting data via sensors for use in home automation, smart energy etc. In this context, DTLS is being considered as the primary protocol for communication security at the application layer and in some cases, it is also being considered for network access authentication. This document provides a specification for a new extension for Optimizing DTLS and TLS Handshake when the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Key Exchange is used. This extension is aimed at reducing the number of messages exchanged and the RTT of the TLS & DTLS Handshakes. Hi, I am submitting my 3rd version of our draft(draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension) in TLS working group. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-jay-… Raja ashok
- Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-… Andreas Walz
- Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-… Jayaraghavendran Kuppannan
- Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-… Andreas Walz
- Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-… Jayaraghavendran Kuppannan
- Re: [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-jay-… Russ Housley