[TLS] Re: Review of draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-08

Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> writes:

> Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> wrote:
>> Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> writes:
>> > It's not undocumented. It's "add these certs to your bucket of certs"
>> > and use them in whatever resolution mechanism you have.
>> 
>> How are clients and servers, respectively, supposed to figure out
>> which keys to include?
>> 
>> Presumably, they should not send their entire key ring, right?  Some
>> properties of the resolution algorithms appear to be needed to pick
>> the "appropriate" keys, and limit the set of keys to send.
>> 
>> Compare RFC 4346, which says on X.509 certs:
>> 
>>    certificate_list
>>       This is a sequence (chain) of X.509v3 certificates.  The sender's
>>       certificate must come first in the list.  Each following
>>       certificate must directly certify the one preceding it.  Because
>>       certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
>>       independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
>>       certificate authority may optionally be omitted from the chain,
>>       under the assumption that the remote end must already possess it
>>       in order to validate it in any case.
>> 
>> What I'm looking for are similar guidelines to decide which OpenPGP
>> keys to include, but I'm skeptical about the existence of useful such
>> guidelines.
>
> Rather than arguing about whether such rules are possible (though 
> I think they are in practice), why don't we see if Pasi wants to
> try to write something?

Yup, agreed.

/Simon

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