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Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (Was: Re: TLS Interim - update and agenda)

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Mon, 09 March 2015 16:54 UTC

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Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 17:53:56 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
References: <CAOgPGoCcexve9+C2bNSGVWUksZCva66OWbf8nrxkg0PquOpZ_w@mail.gmail.com> <201503081424.24976.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <CABcZeBNbjUOJdXM22LNzWJxnvQdGPTwBuLMouEH9FSx=J86xhw@mail.gmail.com> <201503081450.04610.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on various things on agenda (Was: Re: TLS Interim - update and agenda)
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Hi,

Dave Garrett wrote:
> 
> It is of course the obvious choice, which is why I'm speaking up to encourage an alternative. TLS 1.3 is on track to have a one-true-cipher of AES-GCM, with alternatives slowly coming into play. This is something many would like to avoid, so a different decision here could affect that. ChachaPoly also has the benefit of playing nice with hardware, making MTI potentially easier on some. It's not a bad decision if AES-GCM is picked as MTI, but I do think it is very much worth considering the total end result and not just the minimum interop.
> 

There's also my draft for AES-OCB. We're currently working out the IPR
situation (rogaway, IBM, etc.). I still think it's a viable option (more
than CCM) that should be considered /if/ there're no patent
restrictions. In the end CCM was developed because OCB was patented back
then.

On MTI:
- AES-GCM should be MUST not SHOULD.
- ChaCha20/Poly1305 should MUST as well.
..IMHO.

Aaron

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