Re: [TLS] TLS Provfiles (Was: Call for consensus to remove anonymous DH)

[Jeffrey Walton <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 4:45 AM, Stephen Farrell
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> On 16/09/15 09:19, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> Jeffrey Walton <[e-mail]> writes:
>>
>>> Somewhat off-topic, why does TLS not produce a few profiles. One can be
>>> "Opportunistic TLS Profile" with a compatible security posture and include
>>> ADH. Another can be a "Standard TLS Profile" and include things like export
>>> grade crypto, weak and wounder ciphers SSLv3, etc. Finally, there can be a
>>> "TLS Defensive profile" where you get mostly the strong the protocols and
>>> ciphers, HTTPS Pinning Overrides are not allowed so the adversary cannot
>>> break the secure channel by tricking a user, etc.
>>
>> +1.  At the moment you're stuck with everything-all-the-time (or alternatively
>> one-size-misfits-all) where you have to support every single mechanism and
>> quirk and add-on, when all you want most of the time is to set up a basic
>> secure tunnel from A to B.  Having profiles would be a great help, so all the
>> other standards groups that build on TLS can refer to, say, the emebedded-
>> device profile or the PFS-with-PSK profile rather than having to hack around
>> the standard themselves.
>
> We have BCP195 [1] that aims for the "general" case (for
> up to TLS1.2) and a draft [2] (current in IESG evaluation)
> for the embedded case. Are those the kind of thing you're
> after?
>
> If so, and you wanted more, the UTA WG [3] (which produced
> BCP195) would maybe be the best place to see if there's
> enough interest in doing more. (The embedded one was done
> in the DICE WG [4] which was setup mostly for that as it's
> to some extent a different set of folks. And that could be
> done again if needed.)
>
This kinda begs the question, who should be responsible for high level
TLS configurations to ease management, maximize security and minimize
interoperability issues.

For that, I'd argue it falls squarely within TLS WG purview.

One of the things I've noticed (maybe incorrectly): the NSA and other
who want to exert influence do not have to influence a group like the
TLS WG.* There's enough mass and dissension that weakening is organic.
A small selection of profiles could be a strategic move to cut-off
that avenue if it is being taken advantage of.

Strategic planning is something that should to be led by leadership.

Jeff

* Maybe I should say, "not actively influence them", like the case of
RSA Data Securities and the Dual EC generator.