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Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss?

Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> Thu, 26 June 2014 18:10 UTC

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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: "'ekr@rtfm.com'" <ekr@rtfm.com>, "'tls@ietf.org'" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss?
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Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:54:01 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss?
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>From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla
>
> It seems like the arguments for removing static
>RSA apply even more strongly here.

I agree in that client auth + static DH is weaker than client auth + static 
RSA, because the former is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation (KCI). I 
mentioned KCI a while back on this list, but forgot to add that it depends on 
client auth.

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