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Re: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Thu, 23 October 2014 15:19 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "'tls@ietf.org'" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions
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Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 15:18:41 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions
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I've three concerns with NTRU:
- licensing (patents);
- (large) key size; 
- lack of (unbroken) digital signature.

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Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
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----- Original Message -----
From: Richard Fussenegger [mailto:richard@fussenegger.info]
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 09:21 AM
To: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions

On 10/23/2014 3:34 PM, Aaron Zauner wrote:
> 3) the appropriate reaction should be to use post-quantum crypto algorithms instead of doubling the keysize for existing ones. I don't know of any algorithm that can be used for a protocol like TLS as of now.

NTRU [1][2] is the only one that is said to be post-quantum [3][4] and 
it even has a library [5] and seems to have very good performance [6][7].

Richard

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ntru-00
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTRUEncrypt
[3] 
http://middleware.internet2.edu/idtrust/2009/papers/07-perlner-quantum.pdf
[4] 
http://94.242.221.125/bookreader.php/135832/Bernstein_-_Post_Quantum_Cryptography.pdf
[5] http://www.yassl.com/yaSSL/Home.html
[6] 
https://www.securityinnovation.com/uploads/ntru_speed_benchmark_research.pdf
[7] http://paper.ijcsns.org/07_book/200708/20070812.pdf

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