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Re: [TLS] Quest for Unified Solution to TLS Renegotiation

David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org> Sat, 28 November 2009 18:26 UTC

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Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 18:26:20 +0000
From: David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Quest for Unified Solution to TLS Renegotiation
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Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> A) Secure Renegotiation Indicator TLS extension.
> B) Magic cipher_suite.
> C) Bit-fiddled version identifiers.
> 
> We are constrained by the following:
> 
> 1) The mechanism for signalling must not screw up the protocol steps
> for unpatched libraries.
> 2) The mechanism for signalling must be backward-compatible to SSLv3
> (this is my interpretation of what the Area Director stated; please
> correct me if I am wrong).
> 
> Because of constraint number 2, option A cannot be the mandated
> mechanism for the client to signal the server that it supports
> renegotiation continuity.

That's not correct. Option A for S->C signalling works fine in SSLv3.
In the case where the server does not already support extensions, it's
just appending a fixed octet string to the ServerHello, so it is no
more difficult to implement than any other option.

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood  ⚥  http://davidsarah.livejournal.com

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