Re: [TLS] Closing WGLC (was Re: 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Fri, 03 July 2020 03:10 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 23:10:27 -0400
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To: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Closing WGLC (was Re: 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators)
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Great! This document is now ready to progress to the AD.

spt

> On Jun 26, 2020, at 20:00, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com> wrote:
> 
> TLSWG and Chairs,
> 
> I've submitted draft -13 with the appropriate changes.
> 
> Best,
> Nick
> 
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 10:23 AM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> This message closes out the 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators. I have created GH issues for the two issues raised during WGLC:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/issues/62
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/issues/63
> Once addressed, and assuming the changes are not large, we will progress this draft towards our AD.
> 
> I will put the draft in Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead / Revised I-D needed awaiting resolution of the two issues.
> 
> spt (for the chairs)
> 
> > On Jun 5, 2020, at 07:29, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 9:48 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >> 
> >> Another reminder ...
> >> 
> >>> On May 22, 2020, at 09:23, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >>> 
> >>> This is the 3rd WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" draft available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/. The secdir review during IETF LC raised some issues and as a result there have been a couple of new versions. Please respond to the list with any comments by 2359 UTC on 8 June 2020.
> > 
> > I've implemented earlier drafts. I do have a concern with the
> > validate API as presented in the draft: it treats empty authenticators
> > as valid, and then returns the identity as a certificate chain that
> > must be validated by the application. Similar APIs have lead to easily
> > foreseeable pwnage. Instead I would recommend the validate API carry
> > out X509 validation against a trust store or validation function and
> > treat the empty authenticator as invalid. That way someone has to
> > think before not checking the certificate returned.
> > 
> > Sincerely,
> > Watson Ladd
> 
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