[TLS] Kerberos + ECDHE in TLS (v02)

[Rick van Rein <[e-mail]>]

Hello,

I revised my TLS-KDH draft to include comments from this group.  Thanks!

The changes can be summarised as:

* Integration with "normal" X.509 certificates; client may use krb5
certificate
* Kerberos Ticket as X.509 pubkeyinfo; Authenticator as signature mechanism
* Define TLS-standardised hashes as ChecksumTypes for use in an
Authenticator
* Moved TicketRequestFlags to a TLS Extension; negotiation with min/max
flags
* Taken out protocol-bound DH; this saves about 75% of the complexity
* Pre-master secret now incorporates Kerberos session key and DH shared
secret
* Added descriptions of how to support backend servers in Ticket AuthData

I am aware that embedding Kerberos in an X.509 certificate is uncommon;
but it simplifies the rest incredibly, and suddenly everything "clicks"
smoothly into the rest of TLS.  I therefore think this form of
"tunneling" certifying information is worth considering.

Is this something that could be discussed at IETF 95?


Cheers,
 -Rick


> A new version of I-D, draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-02.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Rick van Rein and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:		draft-vanrein-tls-kdh
> Revision:	02
> Title:		TLS-KDH: Kerberos + Diffie-Hellman in TLS
> Document date:	2016-03-11
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		23
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-02.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-02
> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-02
>
> Abstract:
>    This specification defines a TLS message flow with Kerberos-based
>    (mutual) authentication, binding in Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman to
>    achieve Forward Secrecy for the session.