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Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10.txt

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Wed, 03 June 2015 06:20 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 23:20:03 -0700
Message-ID: <CAHOTMVLYRF6uHRuDW_TVH=Bk3aLHmPt2_f8VbVOE_ftscZF5cQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10.txt
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On Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 11:15 PM, Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> These older versions of Java don't support FF-DHE, and the server can send
> a different weaker DHE key to older clients.


As I have "pointed out many times", yes there are ways to work around these
problems, but DHE hardening is presently actively breaking TLS ecosystem.
And for what?

Finite field D-H is taking attention away from ECC, and I think ECC is
clearly the future. What good reason is there for continuing to support it
instead of focusing on ECDH?

I want a TLS ecosystem with less workarounds, less errata, and less
complexity. I see no reason to keep DHE around.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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