Re: [TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server certificate selection
Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> Wed, 21 June 2017 00:18 UTC
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To: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimino.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <CAAgBOhsQT78JrWA6VRx158wOE0gR-VOFawcuvqjwopebDcGA2A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 19:18:53 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server certificate selection
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On 06/20/2017 07:10 PM, Xuelei Fan wrote: > Hi, > > In section 4.4.2.2, "Server Certificate Selection", of TLS 1.3 draft: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20#section-4.4.2.2 > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Dtls13-2D20-23section-2D4.4.2.2&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=KyAQ9PQE3G6JzldFVVDqIYp8yEkeejs2rSUCdjVJSRI&s=409V0VX5d_lLi5gXqSXogLkcmPAmm2tI1ej6PYSX-Xs&e=> > > It is stated: > - The "server_name" and "trusted_ca_keys" extensions [RFC6066 > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_rfc6066&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=KyAQ9PQE3G6JzldFVVDqIYp8yEkeejs2rSUCdjVJSRI&s=PPZRuCZB6NAWaZlV9ka5krfx0GhtYzOkrvqed0LxnDQ&e=>] are > used to guide certificate selection. As servers MAY require the > presence of the "server_name" extension, clients SHOULD send this > extension, when applicable. > The "trusted_ca_keys" extension is not used in TLS 1.3, and is > replaced with the "certificate_authorities" extension (Section 4.2.4): > The "trusted_ca_keys" extension, which serves a similar purpose > [RFC6066 > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_rfc6066&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=KyAQ9PQE3G6JzldFVVDqIYp8yEkeejs2rSUCdjVJSRI&s=PPZRuCZB6NAWaZlV9ka5krfx0GhtYzOkrvqed0LxnDQ&e=>], but is more complicated, is not used in TLS 1.3 (although > it may appear in ClientHello messages from clients which are offering > prior versions of TLS). > > I guess it is a typo or a missed update to use the the > "trusted_ca_keys" extension for server certificate selection in > section 4.4.2.2. The "certificate_authorities" extension should be > used instead. > Missed update most likely; the change log indicates that the switch from trusted_ca_keys to certificate_authorities was made during the history of this document. I filed https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1032 so the change doesn't get lost. -Ben
- [TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server cer… Xuelei Fan
- Re: [TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server… Benjamin Kaduk