[TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server certificate selection

Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimino.com> Wed, 21 June 2017 00:10 UTC

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From: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimino.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 17:10:00 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] The use of "trusted_ca_keys" for server certificate selection
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Hi,

In section 4.4.2.2, "Server Certificate Selection", of TLS 1.3 draft:
   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20#section-4.4.2.2

It is stated:

   -  The "server_name" and "trusted_ca_keys" extensions [RFC6066
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066>] are
      used to guide certificate selection.  As servers MAY require the
      presence of the "server_name" extension, clients SHOULD send this
      extension, when applicable.

The "trusted_ca_keys" extension is not used in TLS 1.3, and is replaced
with the "certificate_authorities" extension (Section 4.2.4):

   The "trusted_ca_keys" extension, which serves a similar purpose
   [RFC6066 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066>], but is more
complicated, is not used in TLS 1.3 (although
   it may appear in ClientHello messages from clients which are offering
   prior versions of TLS).


I guess it is a typo or a missed update to use the the "trusted_ca_keys"
extension for server certificate selection in section 4.4.2.2.  The
"certificate_authorities" extension should be used instead.

Regards,
Xuelei Fan