[TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT)
Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 04 May 2017 01:36 UTC
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 04 May 2017 11:35:56 +1000
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT)
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On 4 May 2017 at 11:31, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote: > Well, for example, Chrome/boringSSL should arguably know better but are treating it all as one equivalent stream. > > Is FF/NSS doing the same thing? Yes. > Why? Because doing anything else makes it a lot harder for the application. I realize that you *want* that, but clearly we disagree about the utility of API hurdles. Given that the application already took extraordinary steps to enable 0-RTT, we don't think that adding artificial hurdles is going to change things.
- [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Securi… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Se… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Se… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Se… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Se… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] One stream to rule them all (was Re: Se… Colm MacCárthaigh