[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2026-02-27)

Tibor Jager <jager@uni-wuppertal.de> Sat, 28 February 2026 17:53 UTC

Return-Path: <jager@uni-wuppertal.de>
X-Original-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4F0EC089F2C for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 09:53:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.098
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=uni-wuppertal.de
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id reDrBoScVxBf for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 09:53:30 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpout3.uni-wuppertal.de (smtpout3.uni-wuppertal.de [132.195.64.73]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 12BE9C089F20 for <tls@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 09:53:29 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpout-intern.uni-wuppertal.de (smtpout-intern.uni-wuppertal.de [IPv6:2001:638:50a:64::33]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange x25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtpout3.uni-wuppertal.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9293D17DCED for <tls@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 18:53:28 +0100 (CET)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=uni-wuppertal.de; s=mail; t=1772301208; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=fSNPWDK8pplFUvVeA8FB6j3IaiY+WK7d4EULRBZDDjc=; b=ddfGanWhZgOqFzj8RZv1C/o/9lEFmHz9zF2Jcd/rTCgtG72mmdb47oPyN+beGDR14qLbio /CDy5bkDwxca2l7I3LlgRietek0OVoINaW/pErV1LAEcyOoRxEC4UqdF8D+txMWGhwAJd0 wMpLdF9vJpJspVDQnHwAX91yhXi7shs=
Received: from mail.uni-wuppertal.de (mail.uni-wuppertal.de [132.195.64.3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange x25519) (No client certificate requested) by smtpout-intern.uni-wuppertal.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6BEB99F246; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 18:53:28 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtpclient.apple (p200300c0cf2287000d39fe41a6e94ee8.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [IPv6:2003:c0:cf22:8700:d39:fe41:a6e9:4ee8]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange x25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.uni-wuppertal.de (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 342DCCE4; Sat, 28 Feb 2026 18:53:28 +0100 (CET)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail-40718AC0-35B4-4ECF-B3A6-EB68C02E1B48"; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha-256"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0)
X-Apple-Notify-Thread: NO
X-Universally-Unique-Identifier: 6E0D7734-7365-4F98-BF93-3B47DB60BAF7
From: Tibor Jager <jager@uni-wuppertal.de>
In-Reply-To: <aaMNMXOURWt4rat9@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald>
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2026 18:53:16 +0100
X-Apple-Message-Smime-Encrypt: YES
Message-Id: <49F1DF6B-8366-43F5-BC41-F78FDE9966FF@uni-wuppertal.de>
References: <aaMNMXOURWt4rat9@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald>
To: Liusvaara Ilari <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (23D127)
X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-0.20 / 100.00]; MIME_GOOD(-0.20)[multipart/signed,text/plain]; SENDER_FROM_WHITELIST_DOMAIN(0.00)[uni-wuppertal.de]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+,1:+,2:~]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; LOCAL_OUTBOUND(0.00)[]; DKIM_SIGNED(0.00)[uni-wuppertal.de:s=mail]
X-Rspamd-Pre-Result: action=no action; module=multimap; Matched map: SENDER_FROM_WHITELIST_DOMAIN
Message-ID-Hash: EU2XRQIL7NVNWYGZEZTFIYSK2KOQVI7V
X-Message-ID-Hash: EU2XRQIL7NVNWYGZEZTFIYSK2KOQVI7V
X-MailFrom: jager@uni-wuppertal.de
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2026-02-27)
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/xtgl2RkIHtYSujXerhPLaERU1mc>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>


> Am 28.02.2026 um 16:43 schrieb Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>:
> 
> On Fri, Feb 27, 2026 at 11:19:41PM +0100, Tibor Jager wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>>> Am 27.02.2026 um 21:16 schrieb Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>:
>>> - There does not seem to be any evidence that ML-KEM is weak. I think
>>> that if ML-KEM gets badly broken, it will be for unforeseeable reasons
>>> (which is a risk for any cryptographic algorithm, including prime-
>>> field ECC).
>> 
>> Except that for a hybrid mode, both ML-KEM and ECC must be broken
>> simultaneously.
> 
> Both must be broken, but not simultaneously.
> 
> If the ML-KEM implementation has side channel or other implementation
> flaw that breaks security, the attacker can still exploit that to break
> the ML-KEM part and later break the ECC part with CRQC to fully
> compromise confidentiality.

You’re right, in the store-now-break later setting it is not simultaneously. Thank you!

> 
>> For almost every broken cryptosystem there was a time when there
>> seemed to be no evidence that it is weak. ML-KEM still needs to stand
>> the test of time.
> 
> Kyber has had consderable analysis in NISTPQC. There was at least
> one candidate (based on lattices) that was not advanced because
> there was too little analysis.
> 
> And in addition to analyis Kyber in NISTPQC, there has been considerable
> amount of analyis of MLWE and general lattice problems before that.

Many other cryptosystems have received considerable analysis before they were broken. 

I am not saying ML-KEM is insecure. It is a very beautiful design, and I really hope it will stand the test of time. But in my opinion it seems not yet well enough understood to put all eggs into one basket, in particular when a hybrid mode is not much more expensive. 

Most importantly, do you see how your example from above is actually another example why a hybrid mode is preferable? In your example, the hybrid scheme is only broken after a CRQC exists. For ML-KEM-only, it is game-over immediately after the flaw that you described is discovered , which seems much worse to me.

Yours sincerely,
Tibor