Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension

> I haven't heard any use cases for the TLS proxy in this discussion
> that are not factually equivalent to wiretapping.

Hm - it may be factually equivalent to wiretapping, but I can think of a
perfectly legitimate use case for a TLS proxy which MITM's a client, with
that client's express consent and knowledge of course - wire-level debugging
of an encrypted session.  I've set something like this up a couple of times
to debug a server that doesn't accept plaintext connections but is still not
behaving correctly; I create a proxy that presents a self-signed certificate
to the client, ignore the security pop-up warning, and then proxy again to
the server (logging everything in between).  In this case, I'm
"wiretapping", but I'm wiretapping myself.

On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 12:30 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> Matt McCutchen wrote:
> >
> > A person using a corporate laptop has no expectation of privacy from the
> > company.  The proxy extension just offers a technically more capable
> > solution for that scenario.
>
> Not everyone is living in totalitarian countries where this might apply.
>
> As I previously said, our constitution provides fundamental gurantees
> of privacy, and protects against both, government agencies spying
> on citizens as well as employers spying on employees.
>
>
> >
> > No one is proposing, per se, that TLS interception be used in any more
> > places than it is now.  Of course, interception may now be used in
> > places where it was always desired but could not be used before due to
> > protocol issues.  However, it's hard to believe that the proxy extension
> > would change the market and/or legal forces that currently restrain ISPs
> > from routinely intercepting customer traffic, if that is what Martin is
> > worried about.
>
> No, it is primarily about the employer spying on employee case, which
> has been clearly ruled unconstitutional in Germany.  But the stiff penal
> code that might provide sufficient deterrant for ISPs does not universally
> apply to employers, leaving you with civil action an "cease and desist"
> and a number of completely clueless entry courts.
>
>
> >
> > The TLS WG may have a personal distaste for the use case addressed by
> > the extension.  But I would reason that the use case is valid, thus the
> > extension is worthy of standardization to get interoperable
> > implementations, and the TLS WG is the best venue available for
> > technical discussion.  As David explained
> > (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg07920.html), the
> > use case does not constitute wiretapping as defined in RFC 2804.
>
> I haven't heard any use cases for the TLS proxy in this discussion
> that are not factually equivalent to wiretapping.
>
>
> -Martin
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