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Re: [TLS] Should we require implementations to send alerts?

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Fri, 18 September 2015 20:49 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2015 16:49:51 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Should we require implementations to send alerts?
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On Friday, September 18, 2015 04:24:33 pm Brian Smith wrote:
> [...] unless a terrible mistake is made [...]

We're designing a security protocol to be used globally. We should be assuming that not only will we have at least one terrible mistake, but also that there's at least a few more that have already been made that we haven't found yet, but will still need to handle. Again, this is a 20 year old mess of a protocol; no development can stem from any premise that expects no flaws.


Dave

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