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Re: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 26 - small typo need correction

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Mon, 05 March 2018 13:34 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2018 08:34:28 -0500
References: <CAG5P2e-vOmCByUQ=10=qh2_iq1DYxSp1Ppvnq1kuFNdh61Xp5Q@mail.gmail.com> <BA5DBBFF-1879-4C31-B028-4467CD136014@sn3rd.com>
To: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 26 - small typo need correction
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Spoke too soon I got the double the in the following PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1164

spt

> On Mar 5, 2018, at 08:30, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> 
> The double “the” got fixed, but the double and didn’t I submitted a PR so we don’t forget this.
> 
> spt
> 
>> On Mar 4, 2018, at 22:52, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> In TLSv1.3, draft 26, there is a small typographical error.  It needs
>> to be corrected.
>> 
>> 
>> (1)
>> 
>> Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility
>> 
>> Second Paragraph.  Second sentence.  There is a double "and".
>> 
>> /* Original */
>> =========
>> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
>> the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least
>> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
>> ==========
>> 
>> /* Corrected */
>> 
>> ======
>> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
>> the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least
>> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
>> ======
>> 
>> (2)
>> 
>> Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters
>> 
>> First paragraph, first sentence.  There is a double "the".
>> 
>> /* Original */
>> =========
>> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
>> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
>> =========
>> 
>> /* Corrected */
>> =========
>> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the
>> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
>> =========
>> 
>> (3)
>> 
>> Appendix E.5.  Replay Attacks on 0-RTT
>> 
>> Second paragraph, second line.  There is a double "the".
>> 
>> /* Original */
>> ===========
>> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
>> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the
>> speed of cryptographic operations.
>> ===========
>> 
>> /* Corrected */
>> ==========
>> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
>> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the
>> speed of cryptographic operations.
>> ==========
>> 
>> Please correct them.
>> 
>> with regards,
>> Saravanan
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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