Re: [Trans] path validation

[Carl Wallace <[e-mail]>]

On 10/1/14, 10:47 AM, "David Leon Gil" <[e-mail]> wrote:

>On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Stephen Kent <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> I disagree. Once Ben said that he meant mis-issuance to be interpreted
>>in a
>> much broader context,
>> and cited EV cert requirements as an example, I pursued documenting what
>> that would mean. If
>> the WG wants to say that mis-issuance is more than issuing a cert to the
>> wrong Subject, then
>> we need to say just what it is, not hand wave.
>
>You are missing the point of certificate transparency.
>
>We have no idea all the forms that misissuance -- particularly
>malicious misissuance -- might take. If it were trivial to detect
>"misissuance", browsers would validate certs for "misissuance" and the
>problem would be solved.
>
>The point of having a log that includes everything signed with a CA's
>key is that analysis of issued certificates can be conducted post-hoc.
>
>Proposals to limit the scope of what logs can log kneecap CT. They
>should not be considered.

Maybe the term mis-issuance should just be discarded.  There seems to be
agreement that logs should accept anything signed by one of the CAs
covered by a log.  Monitors can always detect whatever they want relative
to the certificate collection maintained by a log (be it “mis-issuance” or
something else).