Re: [Trans] WGLC started for draft-ietf-trans-threat-analysis

["David A. Cooper" <[e-mail]>]

I have been unable to find anywhere in my comments where I suggested that syntactic mis-issuance should not be discussed in the document. The "responses" you provided have nothing to do with my comments.

On 05/09/2018 08:49 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:

25. Section 4.2.2 says "However, even if errors are detected and reported to the CA, a malicious/conspiring CA may do nothing to fix the problem or may delay action." As noted previously, no explanation is provided as to why this is a threat or attack. If the Subject knows that there are errors in the certificate, then the Subject can just get another certificate (from a different CA, if necessary). It doesn't matter whether the CA revokes the erroneous certificate or not.
    

See previous comment on why syntactic mis-issuance is included in this document.

29. Section 5.6, paragraph 5 says "If a Monitor is compromised by, or conspires with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a bogus or erroneous certificate targeting that Subject, as noted above." As noted previously, this document needs to explain how an attacker can "target" a Subject with an erroneous certificate.
    

As noted above, Ben insisted that syntactically erroneous certificates were considered mis-issued, and hence motivated inclusion of the text in Section 4.