Re: [Trans] Alternate formats for Precertificates

Tomas Gustavsson <tomas@primekey.se> Wed, 26 February 2014 16:48 UTC

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Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 08:48:16 -0800
From: Tomas Gustavsson <tomas@primekey.se>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Alternate formats for Precertificates
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<snip>

>>>>
>>>> I don't know why I did not think of this earlier, since I use it all the
>>>> time. CMP with CRMF is used in many systems in production. Card
>>>> management, LTE base stations (3GPP standardization), some routers etc.
>>>>
>>>> Re-using existing RFC always feels good :-)
>>>
>>>
>>> RFC4211 says:
>>>     "The fields of CertRequest have the following meaning:
>>>         ...
>>>         serialNumber MUST be omitted.  This field is assigned by the CA
>>>         during certificate creation.
>>>
>>>         signingAlg MUST be omitted.  This field is assigned by the CA
>>>         during certificate creation."
>>>
>>> So that's two ways we would need to violate RFC4211 in order to use its
>>> CertTemplate format for Precertificates.
>>
>>
>> Seems like very minor violations to me. In addition using CRMF would remove
>> the need for the poison certificate extension. CRMF also gives more
>> flexibility as you (RFC 6962 that is) can choose which fields to include
>> and/or exclude, potentially answering to questions like privacy issues and
>> such.
>
> We're only discussing alternatives to avoid breaking ritual compliance
> with the RFC, so selecting another one we have to violate hardly seems
> like forward motion.

Just bringing some more alternatives to the table.
I'm sure modifying RFC4211 is easier than modifying RFC5280 ;-)


>>
>>>
>>> In contrast, allowing a Precertificate/Certificate pair to use the same
>>> serial number only violates RFC5280 in one way.  (Oh, and to me, reusing
>>> the TBSCertificate format feels good too! ;-) )