Re: [Trans] Question about PRIVATE option (Ticket #1)

[Eran Messeri <[e-mail]>]

IMHO Option (ii) is the most straightforward solution. Option (iii) exposes
the client to further complication (supporting private subdomains already
complicates the client code).
For SCT v2 (should we decide to have one) the entry_type could be an
optional field outside the extensions.


On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 12:14 PM, Rob Stradling <[e-mail]>wrote:

> On 11/03/14 20:35, Rick Andrews wrote:
>
>> Rob,
>>
>> What you're suggesting is that the add-pre-chain command can be used to
>> log a cert that ultimately will not include the SCTs in the final cert?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>  That seems like a path forward.
>>
>
> Great.
>
>
>  For the slight complication you describe, I suppose that needs to be
>> added to the issue tracker.
>>
>
> Yes.  I just wanted to check that it would work for you before I did that.
>
> I've just added http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/10
>
>
>  -Rick
>>
>>  -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Rob Stradling [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2014 3:34 AM
>>> To: Rick Andrews; [e-mail]
>>> Subject: Re: [Trans] Question about PRIVATE option (Ticket #1)
>>>
>>> Rick, thanks for raising this.  I agree that we need to make the
>>> PRIVATE
>>> option work in these scenarios.  As it happens, I mentioned this to Ben
>>> just before the trans meeting last week.
>>>
>>> My suggestion is that we should permit both Certificate SCTs _and
>>> Precertificate SCTs_ to be delivered via OCSP Stapling and the TLS
>>> Extension.
>>>
>>> There's no reason why a Precertificate couldn't be issued _after_ the
>>> corresponding Certificate has been issued!  :-)
>>>
>>> Would this work for you?
>>>
>>>
>>> Slight complication...
>>> In the SCT v1 format, entry_type is "implicit from the context in which
>>> the SCT is presented."
>>> So, for the above idea to work, we would need to either:
>>>     i) Define SCT v2, in which entry_type is expressed explicitly.
>>>     or
>>>     ii) Define a CtExtensions extension to carry the entry_type
>>> explicitly in a v1 SCT.
>>>     or
>>>     iii) Expect TLS Clients to attempt to verify v1 SCTs sent via OCSP
>>> Stapling or the TLS Extension twice (first time, assume entry_type is
>>> "x509_entry"; if the SCT signature doesn't verify, try again, this time
>>> assuming entry_type is "precert_entry").
>>>
>>> On 10/03/14 18:58, Rick Andrews wrote:
>>>
>>>> Regarding Issue #1: _http://tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/1#_
>>>> "Need options for avoiding logging private subdomains", I think the
>>>> design is not yet complete.
>>>> I understand how this works when my customer has chosen the precert
>>>> delivery option (I mask the second level domain in the precert that I
>>>> send with the add-pre-chain command).
>>>> But if my customer has chosen to deliver SCTs via OCSP staple or TLS
>>>> extension, and they want to keep their subdomain private, what do I
>>>>
>>> do?
>>>
>>>> I'm going to sign the cert without SCTs in it, but if I log it via an
>>>> add-chain command, the subdomains will be visible in the log.
>>>> -Rick
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Rob Stradling
>>> Senior Research & Development Scientist
>>> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
>>>
>>
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>>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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