Re: [Trans] Providing the history of STHs a log has issued (in 6962-bis)

[Brian Smith <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:55 PM, Matt Palmer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> If you're already requiring auditors to remember what they've seen before,
> why not just get them to remember the STHs they've seen, rather than having
> to remember that they've seen an additive sequence of previous STHs and
> verified that nothing's magically appeared?

In CT, CAs issue certificates that certify a binding of a name to a
public key. From the CT logs' perspective, the CAs are untrusted and
so we don't rely on them to provide a log of certificates they've
issued. Instead, we have CT logs maintain such logs.

Similarly, a CT log issues STHs that certify the state of the log.
>From the auditors' perspective, the CT log is untrusted. Thus, the
auditors' shouldn't rely on the CT logs to log all their STHs.
Instead, the auditors should maintain such logs. In other words, the
CT auditors should operate CT logs that operate on "certificates" that
are actually STHs.

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
https://briansmith.org/