Re: [Trans] Privacy-preserving proof of sct exclusion

Hey Saba,

Read this paper with interest. Thanks for sharing!

Am I correct that the range proof signatures are completely unrelated to
normal log operation? That is, the ordinary log behavior continue to use
commonly supported algorithms (RSA-PKCS1v15 or ECDSA) with only the
intermediate range values being signed to admit proofs of signatures under
commitment?

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 12:27 PM, Saba Eskandarian <sabae@stanford.edu>
wrote:

> Since there wasn't time to present these privacy preserving proofs at the
> meeting last week, I thought it might be of interest to the list that I'll
> be presenting the idea at Stanford's annual security workshop next Monday.
> I believe it will be streamed on youtube, and you may find the other
> presentations interesting as well (http://forum.stanford.edu/
> events/2017security.php). The workshop is aimed at a non-specialist
> audience, but I still hope to get to much of the content I meant to present
> at ietf.
>
> thanks,
> ~saba
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, March 27, 2017 2:48:11 AM
>
> *To:* Saba Eskandarian
> *Cc:* trans@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Trans] Privacy-preserving proof of sct exclusion
>
>
>
> On 27 March 2017 at 05:16, Saba Eskandarian <sabae@stanford.edu> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for the prompt feedback! I'll make sure to address these comments
>> in my talk, and I'm looking forward to discussing design options in person.
>> I suspect that the flexibility of the tools and techniques we use as well
>> as the associated engineering and privacy tradeoffs will make for an
>> interesting discussion.
>>
>
> Afraid I won't be there, but looking forward to hearing more.
>
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> ~saba
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
>> *Sent:* Sunday, March 26, 2017 9:46:21 AM
>> *To:* Saba Eskandarian
>> *Cc:* trans@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [Trans] Privacy-preserving proof of sct exclusion
>>
>>
>>
>> On 25 March 2017 at 22:39, Saba Eskandarian <sabae@stanford.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> I'm on the agenda for Tuesday's meeting to share a privacy-preserving
>>> proof of sct exclusion from a log (I think Eran alluded to this work in a
>>> message a while ago).
>>>
>>> My posted slides will not include many words, so I wanted to share a
>>> link to the preprint of our academic paper on the subject in case anyone
>>> wants to read the details there. The paper is targeted at a somewhat
>>> different audience, but it can be found here:
>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.02209
>>>
>>> Thanks and looking forward to meeting you all next week!
>>>
>>
>> Cool, but I immediately see a problem - you require logs to be in
>> timestamp order, but they aren't. I can't immediately think of a way to get
>> that property without also considerably increasing time to inclusion in the
>> log.
>>
>> That seems undesirable - in fact, we're trying to go the other way, i.e.
>> reduce time to inclusion, in general.
>>
>> Also, engineering reality doesn't change, so increasing time to inclusion
>> is also likely to increase MMD.
>>
>> Secondly, its interesting, but doesn't seem particularly useful: when an
>> SCT corresponds to a cert that has not been included, you want to reveal
>> the cert, not hide it. What you want to hide is who is revealing it.
>>
>> ~saba
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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