Re: [GNAP] Consensus Call on Continuation Request

[Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>]

Hi there
Comments embedded
Thxs

On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 2:58 PM Warren Parad <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Beyond what we're covering here, I see at least one important service that
>> would directly benefit from tokens, around introspection/management api
>> (e.g. is the token still valid?). Here there's no information lookup about
>> a grant, we could just query a bloom filter if we get the authorization to
>> do so. I agree it's not yet included but it's perfectly feasible.
>
> I think we are so focused on the "we can do this and this and thin with
> it" that we aren't thinking about why we *need *it. Instead of what can
> be done we should be thinking about, "what can't be done without it" or
> even perhaps "With it we won't have to..."
>

[FI] I guess we're all guilty of "why not" now and then. But in this
specific case, the need is pretty clear and directly related to the
revocation features we've been discussing.

>
> For instance, it's easy to construct an argument against hypothetical
> value it could provide in cases that don't exist yet. Equally vacuous
> arguments could be made for coupling to the future apis/services endpoints
> when necessary as well as delaying adding the session token to the spec
> until after it is necessary.
>
> Plus the problem is not that you control the AS URI, it's that you have
>> only limited trust for what's in front of that. A bound access token
>> ensures that your call is anthenticated with the same key as before, while
>> the alternative doesn't.
>
> Could you say more about the potential problem here, I'm not totally
> following.
>

[FI] not a big deal when people use a library, but otherwise end developers
may just end up copying the URI directly, not checking the TLD+1. With a
basic stateless URL, a simple compare is enough.

>
> Conceptually, I like the idea to treat the continuation as another kind of
>> resource.
>
> Exactly, and why not. Further just as we can return arbitrary urls in the
> body of a request, why not utilize the hardened REST patterns and return
> them in for instance a Location header. By encouraging custom responses
> having to reassemble future requests we are implicitly saying "We don't
> like any of the existing recommended patterns", and while it's totally okay
> to digress from them, we should have a really good reason to do so.
>

[FI] where did you see that we don't follow any of the existing recommended
patterns?

>
>
> Warren Parad
>
> Founder, CTO
> Secure your user data and complete your authorization architecture.
> Implement Authress <https://bit.ly/37SSO1p>.
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 1:53 PM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> Ok, could you be more specific as to what you'd expect for the persistent
>> identifier ?
>> Thanks
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 1:50 PM Dave Tonge <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> The persistent identifier is not a different issue, the current access
>>> token is used to reference an existing grant
>>> <https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/blob/main/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol.md#referencing-an-existing-grant-request-request-existing>
>>>
>>>
>>> It may not be more difficult for a client to *use* an access token at
>>> the AS / RS. But there is definitely an overhead on the client to
>>> *manage* this separate access token.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, 15 Dec 2020 at 12:10, Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think we always said the access token was different, and handled as a
>>>> bound token.
>>>>
>>>> But it doesn't mean it's more difficult for the client that already
>>>> needs to be able to handle tokens anyway (bearer or not, both cases could
>>>> occur). It's mostly consolidating the logic.
>>>>
>>>> You're anticipating a lot of issues which have no specific reason to
>>>> occur, such as "can't be used with the token management APIs?". The
>>>> management API is part of the same general flow.
>>>> Anticipating issues with rotation is useful, but there are also many
>>>> ways it can be hard to manage through a stateful approach too. And
>>>> fundamentally, having everything in a common model (both for the internals
>>>> of the AS and for the API calls) will help improve by a large margin what
>>>> is probably the weakest point in today's infrastructure. But it's early to
>>>> be definitive as to the downstream impact either way.
>>>>
>>>> As for a persistent identifier instead of a continuation API, and
>>>> generally the end of your message, it's a totally unrelated issue to this
>>>> PR, so I suggest we don't discuss that here, but in a separate issue if
>>>> needed.
>>>>
>>>> Fabien
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 11:08 AM Dave Tonge <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> So we've established that this is a different access token, that
>>>>> requires different handling at the client. So keeping it could cause more
>>>>> confusion?
>>>>>
>>>>> As an RC, I will have to store the continue `uri` as although it could
>>>>> be static it could also be dynamic. Why do I need to store an access token
>>>>> as well. It brings me no benefit as an RC, in fact it brings more
>>>>> complexity. As I will now need to manage multiple types of tokens with
>>>>> different lifecycles:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Continuation token*
>>>>>   - can only be used at the continue endpoint (the name of which is
>>>>> confusing as I can use this endpoint to revoke a grant or get metadata on
>>>>> the grant).
>>>>>  - may be rotated each time it is used, or may not be
>>>>>  - provided in the `continue` section of the response
>>>>>  - must be sender-constrained
>>>>>  - can't be used with the token management APIs?
>>>>>  - can be used to identify the grant when making subsequent grants
>>>>>
>>>>> *Access token(s) to use at RS*
>>>>>   - can only be used at the specified RS
>>>>>   - may be sender constrained
>>>>>   - when used at the RS, will not result in rotation
>>>>>
>>>>> From my perspective, most use-cases will require the RC to have a
>>>>> persistent identifier for the grant. Why not bring this into the protocol
>>>>> and let the AS provide this persistent identifier (through the form of the
>>>>> continue uri). Using a rotating access token as a persistent identifier
>>>>> doesn't seem like the right choice.
>>>>>
>>>>> I see no security benefit to having the continuation access token. It
>>>>> doesn't matter if the continue uri leaks as it is useless without an
>>>>> accompanying signature, i.e. any security benefit of having an access token
>>>>> is already provided by having a signature.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only benefits that I can see are:
>>>>>  - If the AS wants to be fully stateless, then you can encode more
>>>>> data in a token than in a uri
>>>>>  - If the AS wants to have a static endpoint for CRUD operations on
>>>>> the grant
>>>>>  - To allow the AS to identity a previous grant
>>>>>
>>>>> If we dropped the access token for the continue endpoint and rather
>>>>> mandated a dynamic uri this would make things conceptually easier to
>>>>> understand, easier for the RC to implement, easier to debug and less chance
>>>>> of errors when rotating tokens (i.e. race conditions could be quite likely
>>>>> if the AS always rotates the token)
>>>>>
>>>>> *One-off grant with no continuation or ongoing management:*
>>>>> RC sends signature and metadata, no `continue` response provided,
>>>>> therefore no grant management possible
>>>>>
>>>>> *Grant with ongoing management*
>>>>> RC sends signature and metadata, AS responds with a continue uri that
>>>>> has these purposes:
>>>>>  - can be used by the RC to continue/update, read or revoke the grant
>>>>>  - can be used by the RC when making a new grant to identify the
>>>>> previous grant
>>>>>
>>>>> As an RC the only permanent items I need to store are:
>>>>>  - the continue uri associated with the grant
>>>>>  - any access tokens I receive for the grant
>>>>>
>>>>> Dave
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, 15 Dec 2020 at 10:11, Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Torsten,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You're right on both accounts.
>>>>>> - for the first remark, it fits quite nicely the init request  /
>>>>>> continuation pattern
>>>>>> - for the second remark, it is a sort of handle for the
>>>>>> continuation request, which will eventually lead to the issuance or refresh
>>>>>> of standard access tokens
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Having a specific name is a possibility, I actually suggested that
>>>>>> too at some point.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fabien
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 9:50 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Fabien,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Am 12.12.2020 um 12:06 schrieb Fabien Imbault <
>>>>>>> [e-mail]>:
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Hi,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > On the contrary your feedback is most welcome.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > It doesn't accept any token, it needs the particular token as
>>>>>>> described in 3.1 and which is not a bearer token (that's what the "key" :
>>>>>>> true parameter is supposed to convey).
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Let us know if you need more clarifications.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks for the clarification. I think only accepting this kind of
>>>>>>> token at the continuation is a good idea otherwise the AS would need to be
>>>>>>> able to parse and understand all sorts of access tokens.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Conceptually, I like the idea to treat the continuation as another
>>>>>>> kind of resource. However, here are some observations I want to share with
>>>>>>> you:
>>>>>>> - This resource is different as it will issue other access tokens
>>>>>>> (of this kind) to be used in subsequent continuation requests. This
>>>>>>> requires different handing on the client side.
>>>>>>> - This access token (if I understand correctly) is (or at least
>>>>>>> feels like) a handle for the underlying grant. So it is kind of the super
>>>>>>> access token to obtain other access tokens.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would consider using a different term to refer to this special
>>>>>>> access token, grant token or grant handle for example, in order to prevent
>>>>>>> confusion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> best regards,
>>>>>>> Torsten.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Best
>>>>>>> > Fabien
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Le sam. 12 déc. 2020 à 11:33, Torsten Lodderstedt <
>>>>>>> [e-mail]> a écrit :
>>>>>>> > Hi all,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I didn’t follow GNAP closely so bear with me if me question seems
>>>>>>> naive.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > After having skimmed through the current draft and the PR, I‘m not
>>>>>>> sure whether the continuation requests accepts any access token issued to
>>>>>>> the RC or the particular access token returned in the „continue“ element in
>>>>>>> section 3.1..
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Can you please shed some light on this?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > kind regards,
>>>>>>> > Torsten.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Am 12.12.2020 um 03:35 schrieb Fabien Imbault <
>>>>>>> [e-mail]>:
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>>> >> You're completely right. Allowing the dev to be lazy is a very
>>>>>>> good thing in general, because it's what we know will work :-)
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Le sam. 12 déc. 2020 à 03:15, Stephen Moore <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>> >> Hi Fabien,
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> For #3) Even after I typed out the hypothetical attack, that was
>>>>>>> sort of in the back of my mind, it isn't a huge risk there. So I actually
>>>>>>> agree with Dick there. Something doesn't sit right with me for the unique
>>>>>>> URL solution, so I don't like it and came up with a hypothetical that seems
>>>>>>> like it could be a down side.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> I still think the access token model with the signed request is
>>>>>>> the way I'd like to go, because again, it's a mechanism I'd be implementing
>>>>>>> anyway to talk to any 'normal' resource. The fact is there is _something_
>>>>>>> representing context that has to pass back and forth here, whether that is
>>>>>>> an access token (which I feel like is more flexible for extensions etc), a
>>>>>>> unique url, or even a cookie sent in the cookie header. So just to
>>>>>>> re-iterate, I'm a +1 on this pull request, speaking as a lazy developer ;)
>>>>>>> >> -steve
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 8:51 PM Fabien Imbault <
>>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> Again speaking in my own name here.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Dick, we know you'd prefer to have a different design, but this
>>>>>>> PR shouldn't be about that.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Back on your 3 items :
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> 1) yes we could make pre-register mandatory, but we already
>>>>>>> decided that wouldn't be how that would work. We have a client instance
>>>>>>> that allows a more generic and flexible pattern (which BTW also allows what
>>>>>>> you want)
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> 2) instead of blame arguments of who's less
>>>>>>> restful/HATEOAS/whatever that have the tenancy to flame conversations, I
>>>>>>> suggest we speak in less abstract terms and ask ourselves what that means
>>>>>>> in practice for devs. Stephen and several others (myself included) have
>>>>>>> expressed that it wouldn't be harder to implement, it would even simplify
>>>>>>> things quite a lot. If you disagree please send us a code sample to really
>>>>>>> show that point by example, because that's really not obvious.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> 3) "If someone has the client credentials, they can impersonate
>>>>>>> the client, and all bets are off." Are you seriously making this argument?
>>>>>>> Because if you have a better proposal than using cryptographic keys, I'm
>>>>>>> all hears. You make it look like there's a problem, while in reality we're
>>>>>>> only relying on the basic assumption of all modern digital communications.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> And more importantly you never responded to the issues of how to
>>>>>>> avoid the security pitfalls of what you proposed.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Fabien
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Le sam. 12 déc. 2020 à 00:35, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 2:53 PM Stephen Moore <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> But from the spec:
>>>>>>> >> "
>>>>>>> >> When sending a non-continuation request to the AS, the RC MUST
>>>>>>> identify itself by including the client field of the request...
>>>>>>> >> ...
>>>>>>> >> key (object / string) : The public key of the RC to be used in
>>>>>>> this request as described in {{request-key}}. This field is REQUIRED.
>>>>>>> >> ...
>>>>>>> >> "
>>>>>>> >> So on the initial request, the key will be there.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> The client field can be an object or a string. If the client is
>>>>>>> pre-registered, then a string could be provided instead of an object.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> If you don't have the access token, then how do you differentiate
>>>>>>> between two requests from the same web application by two different users?
>>>>>>> Is the web application supposed to have different credentials for every
>>>>>>> request?
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> The AS returns a URI for manipulating the request. I would change
>>>>>>> the spec so that each request would have a unique URI. This is the usually
>>>>>>> RESTful pattern that the resource (the grant request) has an URI.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> So in this case, the easy way out is to pass the access token to
>>>>>>> the client, who then, as i stated before, treats the continue request as a
>>>>>>> RS call (albeit a specialized version of the RS where the RS is the AS) OR
>>>>>>> to use the unique URL,
>>>>>>> >> but that seems open to a brute force attack by a malicious RC.
>>>>>>> (What would be the point of that attack, I don't know, I guess if someone
>>>>>>> had the client credentials but not any subjects/resources they could try to
>>>>>>> intercept the grant via continue... I just don't feel right locking things
>>>>>>> down to unique URLs that way.)
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> If someone has the client credentials, they can impersonate the
>>>>>>> client, and all bets are off.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> LOTS of RS servers return a resource specific URL -- my proposal
>>>>>>> is no different.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> -steve
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 5:33 PM Dick Hardt <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> Hi Stephen
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> The client is signing the first request. The key *might* be in
>>>>>>> the body. The client is signing all the subsequent requests as well. The
>>>>>>> "access token" is not needed by the client to prove it is authorized as the
>>>>>>> client is proving it is the same client again.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> In other words, I don't see the need for an access token, so it
>>>>>>> does not need to be put in a URL or an auth header.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> If a developer really, really wants to hand context back to the
>>>>>>> client for subsequent calls, they can put it in the URL or some other
>>>>>>> method. Putting it in the HTTP Authorization header is confusing because it
>>>>>>> is NOT an access token -- it is the context of the request.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> ᐧ
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 2:01 PM Stephen Moore <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> Even though I've only been lightly following things, I feel the
>>>>>>> need to voice my preference as a developer since I will probably someday
>>>>>>> have to either write a RC or RS...
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> The way I see it is the RC makes the initial request to the AS as
>>>>>>> part of this request, it provides it's key in the body... (So no use of the
>>>>>>> Authorization header)
>>>>>>> >> At this point that request, represented by the continue URL +
>>>>>>> "Access Token", from my lazy developer standpoint, is a Resource Endpoint
>>>>>>> and Access Token, and the AS is acting as a specialized RS in this case.
>>>>>>> >> So my client posts to whatever URL with the 'access token' in the
>>>>>>> authorization header, just like acting on any other resource I have a token
>>>>>>> for. YES, I get a new token value to use every call, and there is a
>>>>>>> decision point of "Do I have another continue, or do I have a real token
>>>>>>> for the resource..." But the mechanism is the same to me in the client.
>>>>>>> >> Personally I like that, because if I have an access_token, I
>>>>>>> already think "Put it in the auth header."
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> So my vote would be +1 for the pull request at this time.
>>>>>>> >> -steve
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 3:04 PM Dick Hardt <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> inline ...
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 9:58 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> >> Others had already responded to this previous thread, but I
>>>>>>> wanted to add a couple points to clarify some things.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>> 3) What the client has to do with the "access token" is not the
>>>>>>> same as access tokens for an RS. The client gets a new "access token" for
>>>>>>> each grant request, and for each API call to the AS, and the client learns
>>>>>>> it can not make any more API calls for that specific request when it does
>>>>>>> not get an "access token" back. This is a completely different design
>>>>>>> pattern than calling an RS API with an access token, and is a new design
>>>>>>> pattern for calling APIs. This adds complexity to the client that it would
>>>>>>> not normally have, and I don't think GNAP is the right place to start a new
>>>>>>> design pattern.
>>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> I’m not sure what you mean by these being different — the whole
>>>>>>> point of the design is that the client would be doing the same thing with
>>>>>>> the access token at the AS that it does with the RS by re-using the access
>>>>>>> token structure. Can you please describe what the differences are, apart
>>>>>>> from the rotation? Presentation of the token and signing of the message are
>>>>>>> identical.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> The client is getting the "access token" from its API. It is not
>>>>>>> using an "access_token" in other API calls to the AS.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Rotation of the access token and artifacts for ongoing
>>>>>>> continuation responses is a separate issue to be discussed:
>>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/87
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> And for what it’s worth, GNAP is absolutely the right place to
>>>>>>> have new designs — not that this is one.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> You are proposing a new way for an API to provide context for
>>>>>>> subsequent API calls. Looks out of scope to me.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>> 4) Clients that only want claims from the AS and no access
>>>>>>> tokens will be required to support an API calling mechanism they would not
>>>>>>> have to support otherwise.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Correct, but the delta between the calls a client would make with
>>>>>>> and without an access token is vanishingly small. The client has to sign
>>>>>>> the initial request in some fashion, and it will sign the continuation
>>>>>>> request in the same exact fashion, but now include an access token in that
>>>>>>> request.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Per my other point, there is no value to me in my implementations
>>>>>>> of passing context back and forth between the client and AS -- so it is
>>>>>>> extra work providing no value.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Also, any client authentication mechanism that wants to use the
>>>>>>> HTTP Authentication header is precluded from using it.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Clients making a request to an AS and not getting an access token
>>>>>>> is a new design pattern. I think it has value and should be included, but
>>>>>>> OAuth today shows us the immense value of getting access tokens for calling
>>>>>>> APIs, and so we shouldn’t optimize away from that pattern.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>>> >>> 5) If the AS does not provide an "access token", there is no
>>>>>>> mechanism for a client to delete the request, as the client is not allowed
>>>>>>> to make a call without an "access token".
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> More properly, if the AS does not provide a “continue” field then
>>>>>>> the client can’t delete the request — and yes, that’s intentional. The AS
>>>>>>> is telling this client instance that it can’t do anything else with this
>>>>>>> ongoing request. If the AS wants to allow the client to manage it, it will
>>>>>>> include the mechanisms to do so in the “continue” field.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> There is nuance in that intention. A related concern is that
>>>>>>> deleting a request does not seem like it is a "continue" operation.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>>> >>> 6) There is no standard identifier for the request. Debugging
>>>>>>> and auditing are hampered by the client and AS having no standard way to
>>>>>>> identifying a request. While one AS may provide a unique URL for each grant
>>>>>>> request, another AS may use a persistent "access token" to identify the
>>>>>>> grant request, and other ASs may issue a new "access token" on each API
>>>>>>> call, providing no persistent identifier for the request.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Debugging and auditing this kind of thing are functions of the
>>>>>>> AS. How is interoperability harmed by different ASs having different
>>>>>>> methods to identify their internal data elements? The client doesn’t need
>>>>>>> any knowledge of the AS’s identifiers, it just needs to know the next steps
>>>>>>> for continuing the negotiation.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Debugging between the client and the AS was what I was referring
>>>>>>> to. How does a client developer identify the request when communicating to
>>>>>>> the AS developer. Seems complicated.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> ᐧ
>>>>>>> >> --
>>>>>>> >> TXAuth mailing list
>>>>>>> >> [e-mail]
>>>>>>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth
>>>>>>> >> ᐧ
>>>>>>> >> --
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>>>>>>> >>
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>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Dave Tonge
>>>>> CTO
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>>> --
>>> Dave Tonge
>>> CTO
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>>> Financial Services Register (FRN 809360) at https://register.fca.org.uk/.
>>> Moneyhub Financial Technology is registered in England & Wales, company
>>> registration number 06909772. Moneyhub Financial Technology Limited 2020 ©
>>> Moneyhub Enterprise, Regus Building, Temple Quay, 1 Friary, Bristol, BS1
>>> 6EA.
>>>
>>> DISCLAIMER: This email (including any attachments) is subject to
>>> copyright, and the information in it is confidential. Use of this email or
>>> of any information in it other than by the addressee is unauthorised and
>>> unlawful. Whilst reasonable efforts are made to ensure that any attachments
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>>> opinions of Moneyhub Financial Technology Limited or of any other group
>>> company.
>>>
>>> --
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