Re: [Uta] Certificate pinning?

Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> Tue, 11 March 2014 22:29 UTC

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Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 15:29:37 -0700
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Certificate pinning?
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On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 1:47 PM, Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com>wrote:

> On 03/11/2014 04:38 PM, Cyrus Daboo wrote:
>
>>
>> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-11>
>>
>>
> Interesting.  Offhand, it seems unfortunate that (for this particular
> mechanism) the indication provided by the server is in the HTTP protocol
> rather than the TLS protocol.   If the indication were in the TLS protocol
> it would presumably be easier to get it incorporated into TLS stacks and
> automatically checked by client applications.
>

Yep, that's one of the rationales behind TACK:

http://tack.io
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perrin-tls-tack-02


Trevor