Re: [Uta] Proposed definition of opportunistic encryption using TLS: draft-hoffman-uta-opportunistic-tls-00.txt

[Paul Hoffman <[e-mail]>]

On Feb 3, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Alan Johnston <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I think this is the opportunisticky property that we need a good working definition.  However, in the next paragraph, sentences such as this, don't help:
> 
>    When an application that supports opportunistic encryption negotiates
>    TLS, that application might or might not authenticate the TLS server.
> 
> 
> That is true, but it is irrelevant to the definition.  

Unfortunately not, because authentication is inherently part of TLS, so we have to call out what in TLS we are doing differently.

> An opportunistic encryption system might also use PFS, do logging, cache keys, or any number of other things.

All those are optional; authentication of the server by the client is not.

>   We need separate definitions for each of these, and not conflate them together. Otherwise, we can't make any sensible recommendations about opportunistic approaches, especially when different people conflate different things and use the same word.

I'm definitely open to wording suggestions.

--Paul Hoffman