Re: [VoT] Security Problem with Primary Credential Usage

That makes sense, tho that didn't come across in the description of the
trustmark.

Julian
On 12 May 2016 19:45, "Justin Richer" <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> We explicitly left those kinds of things out of the vector as they’d
> really be related to the IdP itself and not the authentication transaction
> to which the VoT refers. In other words, the security of the IdP is related
> to the trust framework and assessment of the IdP and it can be published as
> part of the IdP’s discovery documents and associated trust marks. This is
> information that is going to remain the same regardless of the transaction.
>
> This is also part of why you need to have a trustmark context to interpret
> the VoT in.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On May 12, 2016, at 11:11 AM, Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I have a number of comments and questions (see attached), many of which
> are related to the issues raised by Chris, some maybe my misunderstanding
> coming in half way through the drafting tho.
>
> I, like Chris, also think there needs to be something more explicit around
> the "security" of the IdP authentication which includes the measures to try
> and detect 'odd' things (like MITM). I would also go one step further in
> that I also want to know about the maturity of the IdP's "security", its of
> no use to me if they have really good credentials but store all the data in
> the clear on their website or have a load of administrative back-doors that
> could let anyone generate a valid authentication response.
>
> It feels like we need to do more work in this area.
>
> Regards,
>
> Julian.
>
> On 8 May 2016 at 13:24, Chris <cnd@geek.net.au> wrote:
>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> I think there is a critical flaw in section 3.2 of
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-02 (Primary
>> Credential Usage)
>>
>> Mutual-authentication is missing.  When no provision is made to prevent
>> man-in-the-middle, credential harvesting, spoof, phishing, malware, or
>> other common threats, this renders all possible vectors C0, Ca, Cb, Cd, Ce,
>> Cf, and others *equally* untrustworthy.
>>
>> We should consider inclusion either for the overall strength of the
>> authentication process, or some breakdown of either all the techniques used
>> or the strength of protection employed to thwart at least common attack
>> scenarios.
>>
>> This problem gets tricky quite fast:
>>
>> Do we identify the authentication technology vendor? (if yes - who works
>> out their resistance strength to common attacks?  what about different
>> modes?)
>> Do we broadly identify the techniques (whos opinions count as to whether
>> or not the technique is effective and against what threats?)
>> Do we identify or classify the threats and indicate which ones were
>> mitigated (who should be trusted to decide if these really were mitigated?)
>>
>> For example - tamper-proof hardware digital certificate devices with
>> biometrics unlocks are totally useless, if the user paid no attention to a
>> broken SSL warning, or has malware.  They're also equally useless in most
>> corporate environments that use deep-packet inspection firewalls - and
>> "unexpected certificates" (eg. from DPI or malicious) carry their own
>> privacy problems (eg: passwords are not as "protected" as you think).  Much
>> more common authentication "protection" of course, are two-step or sms one
>> time codes - which are equally useless when an end user can be tricked into
>> revealing them to spoof sites.
>>
>> 91% of successful break-ins start from phishing.  Right now, every vector
>> is pointing one way - we need at least one "Vector of Trust" to point
>> *back* the other way!
>>
>> How about a 5th vector - "S" for "Security", which somehow allows an RP a
>> level of confidence in the protection afforded to the user's actual
>> authentication process, in terms of (or at least considering) a wide range
>> of (and all common) modern threats.
>>
>> Chris.
>>
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