Re: [websec] DNS publication of HSTS and PKP header data using CAA

Joseph Bonneau <jbonneau@gmail.com> Wed, 08 April 2015 23:38 UTC

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From: Joseph Bonneau <jbonneau@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2015 16:38:25 -0700
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To: ryan-ietfhasmat@sleevi.com
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Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, websec <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] DNS publication of HSTS and PKP header data using CAA
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On Wed, Apr 8, 2015 at 3:35 PM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietfhasmat@sleevi.com> wrote:
> On Wed, April 8, 2015 3:00 pm, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-webseccaa-00
>>
>>  It is a pretty straightforward proposal.

> I believe it was so obvious that the IETF has already beat you to the
> punch - RFC 6698.
>
> In either event, I see no reason to standardize Yet Another Way to do the
> same thing.

I do. Not all Ways to Do The Same Thing are equal in practice, even if
they're equal in theory.

DANE is complicated and has a completely different syntax. It is a 37
page long. Philip's proposal is 6 pages long. There is probably more
to be added but that is still telling. If a busy site admin asks "how
can I close the trust-on-first-use hole for my site?" Would we rather
reply with:

1) Copy your HSTS and HPKP headers into a DNS record

or

2) Go read up on how DANE works, come up with a DANE policy that's
compatible with your HSTS/HPKP preferences (which may not be precisely
possible), and keep the two policies compatible as they evolve.

Perhaps DANE offers sufficiently extra expressive power for some
super-energetic admins will prefer approach 2, but I think 9 of 10
developers (at least) would rather only have to learn and manage one
syntax.

My recent research on HSTS and HPKP deployment in practice has
convinced me that much more attention needs to be paid to making
developer's lives easier.