Re: [websec] DNS publication of HSTS and PKP header data using CAA

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Mon, 27 April 2015 11:13 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 07:13:18 -0400
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Cc: websec <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] DNS publication of HSTS and PKP header data using CAA
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On Wed, Apr 8, 2015 at 6:00 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker
<phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-webseccaa-00
>
> It is a pretty straightforward proposal:
>
> * Use the CAA record with either the hsts or hpkp tag
> * Put the same text you would have put into the CAA record value field
>
> There are a few differences in interpretation. All we are trying to do
> here is to help people to close the 'secure after first use' hole, not
> replace.
>
> Given that we have quite a bit of use of HSTS headers, providing a
> mechanism for publishing this in the DNS looks like being the obvious
> approach.
>
Off topic, but related: "Please add Pinning Pinsets and CSP to App
Manifest," https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1158756.

The more channels this information is available the better. Choice is
always good. And context specific security information is even better.