[websec] #7: clarify and add examples/justification wrt connection termination due to tls warnings/errors
"websec issue tracker" <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org> Fri, 08 July 2011 22:57 UTC
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Subject: [websec] #7: clarify and add examples/justification wrt connection termination due to tls warnings/errors
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#7: clarify and add examples/justification wrt connection termination due to tls warnings/errors http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/websec/current/msg00045.html Subject: Re: [websec] Some questions about HSTS From: "Steingruebl, Andy" <asteingruebl@paypal-inc.com> Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 09:57:21 -0700 (08:57 PST) To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>, "'websec@ietf.org'" <websec@ietf.org> > In sections 2.4.1.1, point #9 says: > 9. UAs need to prevent users from clicking-through security > warnings. Halting connection attempts in the face of secure > transport exceptions is acceptable. > What exactly are these secure transport exceptions? Expired certificates? > Mismatched FQDN? Revoked certificates? Unreachable CRL? Untrusted CA? > Self-signed? Anything that would currently pop a browser warning for a user currently. Browsers differ slightly in how they handle OCSP, etc. In any case where a browser has already made the policy decision it should show a certificate "error", it must now abort. > Also, I don't understand why this change is needed. HSTS is supposed to stop > a very specific attack vector - a user duped into using insecure HTTP over the > (presumably secure) HTTPS. > > As it is, HSTS cannot be used by servers with self-signed or corporate > certificates, for fear that user agents may not allow the user to browse. That is correct. I personally believe, as do several of the contributors on this (and I hope I'm not speaking too much out of turn) that self- signed certificate warnings are just a punt, and an easy way for a user to make a bad security decision. If you want to support HTTPS, do it with a cert that your browser already trusts. Anything else is just a recipe for a MiTM attack. If a host advertises HSTS, it is specifically opting into this scheme, whereby all certificate warnings will cause abort, with no chance to "fool" the user into making the wrong decision. -- -------------------------------------------+-------------------------------- Reporter: jeff.hodges@… | Owner: =JeffH Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Component: strict-transport-sec | Version: Severity: Active WG Document | Keywords: -------------------------------------------+-------------------------------- Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/7> websec <http://tools.ietf.org/websec/>
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