Re: [websec] #42: STS exception for CRL fetching

<hat="individual">
+1. I would agree with Jeff on that.
(Mostly because I see no other good solution.)
Any other comments/ideas on this one?

Best regards, Tobias

On 15/06/12 02:06, =JeffH wrote:
> > This is about fetching CRLs from a domain that happens to be the 
> same as
> > that of a website.
> >
> > Obviously you can't get a CRL or an OCSP response over HTTPS. Jeff's
> > response was that they should use a different domain name for the 
> CRLs (if
> > they want to deploy HSTS)
> >
> > Obviously, it's too late to change AIA or CDP in existing 
> certificates. But
> > I think it goes deeper. HSTS affects what the browser is doing. 
> Different
> > resources from the same domain should all be protected by TLS. But 
> we don't
> > expect this to affect things that are outside the browser, like 
> email or
> > system updates. IMO the fetching of CRLs or OCSP responses is not 
> part of
> > the browsing, but part of the HTTPS handshake. The fact that some 
> browsers
> > implement both is besides the point. Internet Explorer uses an OS 
> library to
> > do the TLS handshake, including any checking of revocation. In fact 
> getting
> > the CRL fetch function to apply the HSTS policy would require extra 
> effort
> > from the browser implementer.
> >
> > I think we should simply say that HSTS does not apply to non-content.
> > Fetching CRLs or browser software updates is not content, and HSTS 
> should
> > not apply to it.
>
> Unfortunately, we would then have to define what comprises "content", 
> and that's a huge rathole I think we should unequivocally avoid.
>
> I've taken a (ad-hoc, limited, unscientific) look at the AIA and CDP 
> in some existing certificates (from major CAs), and all of the ones I 
> checked used a dedicated subdomain for their OCSP responder, e.g...
>
>   evsecure-crl.verisign.com
>   evsecure-ocsp.verisign.com
>   SVRSecure-G3-crl.verisign.com
>   ocsp.verisign.com
>   ocsp.thawte.com
>   crl.thawte.com
>
>
> So in order not to cause themselves and their customers problems, CAs 
> simply shouldn't issue HSTS policy with "includsubdomains" from their 
> top-level domain name, and they will be fine. This is already 
> discussed in S 10.3 of the HSTS draft.
>
> HTH,
>
> =JeffH
>
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