Re: [websec] Consensus call: Issue #57 (max-max-age)

Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> Tue, 04 June 2013 17:18 UTC

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Date: Tue, 04 Jun 2013 08:24:36 -0700
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [websec] Consensus call: Issue #57 (max-max-age)
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On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 4:07 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:

>
>  If we want to find out a hash of the public key for an HTTPS server
> using heavy infrastructure, we might as well use DANE, no?
>


If TLSA records have typical DNS TTLs (a few hours or days), then they will
probably be too short-lived to be effectively stored in lists and
downloaded to browsers, etc.

If they are longer-lived, then all the issues we're discussing here will
still arise (a DNS hijacker or disgruntled sysadmin setting a long-lived
DANE pin, etc.).


Trevor