[websec] Alissa Cooper's Yes on draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-19: (with COMMENT)

["Alissa Cooper" <[e-mail]>]

Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-19: Yes

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COMMENT:
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I agree with Pete's comment about the first sentence.

It would be nice if in Section 5 or 7 some suggestion could be made for
UAs to consider the relationship between the functionality they provide
to clear pins/pinned hosts and the functionality they provide to clear
(or prevent the storage of) other UA state. E.g., upon clearing one's
browsing history or entering private browsing mode, it seems like having
the option to clear pins/pinned hosts or not pin would make sense. This
is alluded to in Section 7 but not really tied to the threat described in
Section 5.

I'm also curious about whether there is any reason to retain expired
pins? (Other than the fact that flushing them requires the UA to actively
check which ones are expired.)