Re: [xmpp] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-10: (with COMMENT)

Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <> Tue, 11 August 2015 02:17 UTC

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To: Mahesh Jethanandani <>
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From: Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <>
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Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 20:17:04 -0600
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Subject: Re: [xmpp] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-10: (with COMMENT)
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Hi Mahesh,

I suggest that we add a section something like the following to 
draft-ietf-xmpp-dna and then add a section to draft-ietf-xmpp-posh as 
well (I haven't written any text for the latter yet, thus the "FIXME" 
for a section number in what follows).


8.  Guidance for Server Operators

    This document introduces the concept of a prooftype in order to
    explain and generalize the approach to establishing a strong
    association between the DNS domain name of an XMPP service and the
    XML stream that a client or peer server initiates with that service.

    The operators of XMPP services will not directly deploy DNA
    prooftypes, and the operations and management implications will
    depend on the prooftypes that an operator supports.  For example:

    o  To support the PKIX prooftype [RFC6120], an operator needs to
       interact with a certification authority but does not need to
       deploy DNS security.

    o  To support the DANE prooftype [I-D.ietf-dane-srv], an operator can
       generate its own certificates or obtain them from a certification
       authority but needs to deploy DNS security.

    o  To support the POSH prooftype [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh], an operator
       can generate its own certificates or obtain them from a
       certification authority but does not need to deploy DNS security.

    Considerations for use of the foregoing prooftypes are explained in
    the relevant specifications.  See in particular Section 13.7 of
    [RFC6120], Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-dane-srv], and Section FIXME of

    Naturally, these operations and management considerations are
    additive: if an operator wishes to use multiple prooftypes, the
    complexity of deployment increases (e.g., the operator might want to
    obtain a PKIX certificate from a certification authority for use in
    the PKIX prooftype and generate its own certificate for use in the
    DANE prooftype).  This is an unavoidable aspect of supporting as many
    prooftypes as needed in order to ensure that domain name associations
    can be established in the largest possible percentage of cases.


What do you think?

(I haven't shared this text yet with my co-authors, since I've been 
working on it just now.)


On 8/10/15 8:09 PM, Mahesh Jethanandani wrote:
> Peter,
> I agree. As I suggested in the review, a reference to the section you reproduce below from draft-ietf-dane-srv (and a similar reference to a section in draft-ietf-xmpp-posh) is what you need in draft-ietf-xmpp-dna.
> Cheers.
>> On Aug 10, 2015, at 4:31 PM, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <> wrote:
>> Hi Benoit, I posted a reply to the OPS-DIR review here:
>> My feeling is that it would be best for this document to point to the companion documents (draft-ietf-xmpp-posh and draft-ietf-dane-srv) with regard to operations and management. Note that draft-ietf-dane-srv already includes the following text:
>> ###
>> 6.  Guidance for Server Operators
>>    To conform to this specification, the published SRV records and
>>    subsequent address (A and AAAA) records MUST be secured with DNSSEC.
>>    There SHOULD also be at least one TLSA record published that
>>    authenticates the server's certificate.
>>    When using TLSA records with Certificate Usage "DANE-EE", it is not
>>    necessary for the deployed certificate to contain an identifier for
>>    either the source domain or target server host name.  However,
>>    operators need to be aware that servers relying solely on validation
>>    using Certificate Usage "DANE-EE" TLSA records might prevent clients
>>    that do not support this specification from successfully connecting
>>    with TLS.
>>    For TLSA records with Certificate Usage types other than "DANE-EE",
>>    the certificate(s) MUST contain an identifier that matches:
>>    o  the service domain name (the "source domain" in [RFC6125] terms,
>>       which is the SRV query domain); and/or
>>    o  the target server host name (the "derived domain" in [RFC6125]
>>       terms, which is the SRV target host name).
>>    Servers that support multiple service domains (i.e., so-called
>>    "multi-tenanted environments") can implement the Transport Layer
>>    Security Server Name Indication (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] or its functional
>>    equivalent to determine which certificate to offer.  Clients that do
>>    not support this specification will indicate a preference for the
>>    service domain name, while clients that support this specification
>>    will indicate the target server host name.  However, the server
>>    determines what certificate to present in the TLS handshake; e.g.,
>>    the presented certificate might only authenticate the target server
>>    host name.
>> ###
>> Is that text helpful and complete? (Note that draft-ietf-dane-srv has already been approved for publication, but if we need to make some slight adjustments during AUTH48 we could do so.)
>> Also, do you think it would be preferable for draft-ietf-xmpp-posh to include a similar section providing guidance for server operators in draft-ietf-xmpp-posh? If so, Matt and I can work to formulate some text.
>> Thanks!
>> Peter
>> On 8/6/15 4:33 AM, Benoit Claise wrote:
>>> Benoit Claise has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-10: No Objection
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>> Please refer to
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> The conversation started between Mahesh (OPS-DIR reviewer) and the
>>> authors on the following points:
>>> Summary:
>>> This document defines new “prooftype” used to establish a strong
>>> association between a domain name and an XML stream. There are two
>>> companion documents draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-04 and draft-ietf-dane-srv-12
>>> that should be viewed as part of reviewing this document.
>>> If there are any management requirements to configure the new
>>> “prooftype”, they have not been discussed as part of this document. I did
>>> not review the companion documents to see if management of the feature
>>> has been addressed in them. This document should talk about how the
>>> feature will be managed, even if it means referring to relevant sections
>>> of the other documents. If there is a need to define a YANG model to
>>> configure the feature, it should be identified, even if it is not defined
>>> in this document.
>>>>  From an operational perspective, it would be helpful to know how this
>>> would be deployed in the field. Are there any issues beyond certificate
>>> configuration that operators should be aware of? Some of the services are
>>> replacements for existing services, e.g. DNS with secure DNS. How would
>>> the operators role out the service in the field with existing
>>> service(s)?
>>> Section 3:
>>> The document talks about establishing a client to server Domain Name
>>> Association (DNA) in this section. This is a simpler case of the server
>>> to server DNA. However, it is not clear what happens if the certificate
>>> verification fails. Is the behavior the same as when a self-signed
>>> certificate is presented? Is there a fallback process or does the session
>>> just terminate?
>>> In addition, the following nits should be addressed in the document.
>>>    Checking nits according to :
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>    == There are 2 instances of lines with non-RFC2606-compliant FQDNs in
>>> the
>>>       document.
>>>    Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>       (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative
>>> references
>>>       to lower-maturity documents in RFCs)
>>>    == Outdated reference: A later version (-14) exists of
>>>       draft-ietf-dane-srv-12
>>>    ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4949
>>>    -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'XEP-0220'
>>>    == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-uta-xmpp has been published as RFC
>>> 7590
>>>    -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 3920
>>>       (Obsoleted by RFC 6120)
>>>       Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 3 comments
>>> (—).
>>> Thanks.