Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch

Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se> Mon, 23 September 2013 14:05 UTC

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Subject: Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch
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On 09/23/2013 02:33 PM, Sam Hartman wrote:
>>>>>> "David" == David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> writes:
>     David> Section 1.  i) Data Minimization and User Participation:
>     David> "There is currently no direct client participation in this
>     David> decision." (i.e. release of identity attributes). We should
>     David> say at this juncture that this is a major deficiency in
>     David> existing federated systems, since the user does not have full
>     David> consent or control over which of his identity attributes are
>     David> released. This should be fixed in Abfab
>
> I do not support this change.
>
> There are some cases where this is a major deficiency, but it's not
> entirely clear whether fixing this at the ABFAB layer is the right
> approach.
>
> I'd argue that trying to fix the concent problem in a general manner at
> the federation layer may have done more harm over the years than the
> privacy problem that is trying to be addressed.
With my chair-switch secured in the OFF position: I agree with Sam
100% here.
>
>
>     David> iii) I dont buy into your whiteboard example of single entity
>     David> authentication, because a hacked whiteboard could trick the
>     David> user into opening the wrong file, which could be disasterous
>     David> during an important business meeting. SO mutual
>     David> authentication is needed here as well. If you want an example
>     David> where mutual authentication is not important, its one where
>     David> either the information being accessed is of very little value
>     David> to the accessor so that it does not matter if it is erroneous
>     David> information or not, or one where it does not matter who the
>     David> accessor is i.e. its public information.
>
> Most of the tools I'm familiar with for screen sharing etc would not
> allow the white board to pick the presentation/file.
> I'd support adding a comment that you don't want to run UI on the white
> board, but no I think I completely disagree with your proposed
> constraints on when this is useful.
>
> --Sam
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